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Abstract
We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. We
identify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and - in economic environments -
su¢ cient for full implementation in ex post equilibrium. We also identify an ex post monotonicity
no veto condition that is su¢ cient.
Ex post monotonicity is satis￿ed in all single crossing environments with strict ex post
incentive constraints. In many economically signi￿cant environments, ex post implementation
can be achieved in the direct mechanism.
We show by means of two classic examples that ex post monotonicity does not imply nor
is it implied by Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost su¢ cient for complete information
implementation). The single unit auction with interdependent valuations is shown to satisfy
ex post monotonicity but not Maskin monotonicity. Ex post implementation in the direct
mechanism is also possible in this case. We describe an example where the Pareto correspondence
fails ex post monotonicity but Maskin monotonicity is satis￿ed.
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1 Introduction
Recent research in auction theory, and mechanism design theory more generally, has lead to a better
understanding of models with interdependent rather than private values. Much of this work has
used the solution concept of ex post rather than Bayesian equilibrium.1 The analysis of ex post
equilibrium is considerably more tractable, because incentive compatible transfers can frequently
be derived with ease and single crossing conditions generating incentive compatibility are easy
to identify. A conceptual advantage of ex post equilibrium is its robustness to the informational
assumptions about the environment. In particular, it often seems unrealistic to allow the mechanism
to depend on the designer￿ s knowledge of the type space as Bayesian mechanisms do.2
Research on interdependent values has focussed almost exclusively on the incentive compat-
ibility of the social choice problem in the direct mechanism. In contrast, this paper focuses on
the problem of full rather than partial implementation. The task for the designer, who does not
know the agents￿types, is to choose a mechanism such that in every equilibrium of the mechanism,
agents￿play of the game results in the outcome speci￿ed by the social choice objective at every
type pro￿le. If the social choice problem is described by a social choice set, a set of social choice
functions, then full implementation also requires that every selection from the set can be realized as
an ex post equilibrium under the mechanism. This problem has been analyzed under the assump-
tion of complete information, i.e., there is common knowledge among the agents of their types (see
Maskin (1999)). It has also been analyzed under the assumption of incomplete information, on the
assumption that there is common knowledge among the agents of the prior (or the priors) accord-
ing to which agents form their beliefs (see Postlewaite & Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey & Srivastava
(1989a) and Jackson (1991)). While complete information (or Nash) implementation and incom-
plete information (or Bayesian) implementation are well understood, the ex post implementation
problem has not been analyzed. In this paper, we develop necessary and su¢ cient conditions for
ex post implementation, both in general environments and also in settings of special interest for
auction theory.
A strategy pro￿le in an incomplete information game is an ex post equilibrium if each action
pro￿le is a Nash equilibrium at every type pro￿le. Put di⁄erently, each player￿ s incomplete in-
formation strategy mapping types to messages must remain a best response even if he knew the
1See Dasgupta & Maskin (2000), Jehiel & Moldovanu (2001), Perry & Reny (2002) and Bergemann & Valimaki
(2002) among many others.
2In an earlier contribution, Bergemann & Morris (2004), we pursued this argument formally in the context of
truthful (or partial) implementation. We showed that in many environments a social choice problem can be truthfully
Bayesian implemented for all priors if and only if it can be truthfully ex post implemented. In this paper, we take
the solution concept of ex post equilibrium as given.Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 3
types of his opponents. We introduce an ex post monotonicity condition that - along with ex
post incentive compatibility - is necessary for ex post implementation. We show that a slight
strengthening of ex post monotonicity - the ex post monotonicity no veto condition - is su¢ cient
for implementation with at least three agents. The latter condition reduces to ex post monotonicity
in economic environments. These results are the ex post analogues of the Bayesian implementation
results of Jackson (1991), and we employ similar arguments to establish our results. But just as ex
post incentive compatibility conditions are easier to verify and interpret, the ex post monotonicity
condition is easier to verify and interpret than the Bayesian monotonicity condition, because it
depends on complete information utilities and do not involve the prior or posterior distributions of
the agents.
Because an ex post equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium at every type pro￿le, there is a natural
relationship between ex post and Nash implementation. When we compare the complete with the
incomplete information settings, two important di⁄erences regarding the ability of the agents to
sustain equilibrium behavior emerges. On the one hand, with complete information, the agents
have the ability to coordinate their actions at every preference pro￿le. This makes the designer￿ s
problem harder. On the other hand, with complete information the designer can detect individual
deviations from the reports of the other agents. This makes the designer￿ s problem easier. The
ability of the agents to coordinate in complete information settings makes the task of implementing
the social choice outcome more di¢ cult for the designer, but it is made easier by the lack of
individual incentive constraints. With incomplete information, the ￿rst problem becomes easier,
but the second becomes harder. As these two e⁄ects are in con￿ ict, we will show that ex post and
Maskin monotonicity are not nested notions. In particular, either one of them can hold while the
other one can fail. Interestingly, in the class of single crossing environments, ex post monotonicity
is always guaranteed as is Maskin monotonicity. Even though ex post monotonicity has to include
ex post incentive constraints absent in the complete information world, it turns out that the local
property of single crossing indi⁄erence curves is su¢ cient to guarantee ex post monotonicity in the
presence of strict rather than weak ex post incentive constraints.
The "augmented" mechanisms used to obtained our general positive ex post implementation
results inherit some complex and unsatisfactory features from their complete information and
Bayesian counterparts. The hope often expressed in the literature is that it should be possi-
ble to show in speci￿c settings that less complex mechanisms are required. We are able to identify
a number of important settings where ex post implementation is only possible when it is possible
in the direct mechanism. This is true, for example, if the social choice function has a su¢ ciently
wide range or if the environment is supermodular.
We also use the methods developed for the general case to show that the direct mechanismEx Post Implementation March 25, 2005 4
has a unique ex post equilibrium in the problem of e¢ ciently allocating goods when bidders have
independent values (see Dasgupta & Maskin (2000) and Perry & Reny (2002)). And in this context,
the interdependent value model delivers new and positive results. With at least three symmetric
bidders, we show that the generalized Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) allocation can be ex post im-
plemented in the direct mechanism, even though Maskin monotonicity fails. This result is in stark
contrast with the impossibility to Nash implement the single unit auction with private values. The
positive result relies on interdependence. The latter intuition is also con￿rmed by contrasting our
positive results with a recent result by Birulin (2003). He shows that with two bidders there are
multiple and ine¢ cient ex post equilibria in the single unit auction. With two agents, bidder i
can use a non-truthful bidding strategy to exactly o⁄set a non-truthful bidding strategy of bidder
j. With more than two agents, the strategy of bidder i cannot incorporate anymore the bidding
behavior by j and k and truthtelling becomes the unique ex post equilibrium strategy.
For twenty years from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, there was a large literature devoted
to the problem of full implementation. While elegant characterizations of implementability were
developed, the "augmented" mechanisms required to achieve positive results were complex and
seemed particularly implausible. While the possibility of multiple equilibria does seem to be a
relevant one in practical mechanism design problems, particularly in the form of collusion and shill
bidding, the theoretical literature is not seen as having developed practical insights (with a few
recent exceptions such as Ausubel & Milgrom (2005) and Yokoo, Sakurai & Matsubara (2004)). For
some reason, the gap between pure implementation theory and practical market design has appeared
especially stark when thinking about full implementation. Following Wilson (1987), we hope that
by relaxing unrealistic implicit common knowledge assumptions, we will deliver predictions that
are more robust and practical. While the complete information implementation literature makes
the assumption of common knowledge of preferences, the Bayesian implementation literature makes
the assumption that there is common knowledge of a prior on a ￿xed set of types; this both seems
unlikely to practical market designers and is a substantive constraint when viewed as a restriction
on all possible beliefs and higher order beliefs.3 Our hope is partially vindicated by the results of
this paper: it does turn out that in many environments of interest, augmented mechanisms cannot
deliver ex post implementation when direct mechanisms cannot. Of course, direct mechanisms
also have their own robustness critiques, but a number of important papers have shown that, in the
type of interdependent environments discussed in this paper, direct mechanisms can be replicated
by more plausible auction mechanisms.4
3The common knowledge of a common prior assumption has particularly strong consequences in mechanism design,
as argued by Neeman (2004) and Bergemann & Morris (2004).
4See Dasgupta & Maskin (2000) and Perry & Reny (2002).Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 5
In this paper, we take the solution concept of ex post equilibrium as given. In a companion
paper, Bergemann & Morris (2005), we address the problem of "robust implementation". There
we analyze the problem of Bayesian implementation under the assumption that the designer knows
nothing about what the agents know or believe about the other agents￿types, their payo⁄s or their
high-order beliefs. While the incentive compatibility constraints for this problem are the same as
for the ex post implementation problem,5 the resulting "robust monotonicity" condition (equivalent
to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces) is strictly stronger then ex post monotonicity (and
Maskin monotonicity). The resulting robust monotonicity notions provide the full implementation
counterparts to the robust mechanism design (i.e. partial implementation) questions pursued in
Bergemann & Morris (2004).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the formal environment and solution
concepts. Section 3 introduces the notion of ex post monotonicity and compares it to Maskin
monotonicity in a simple public good example. Section 4 shows that ex post monotonicity is
necessary and, in economic environments, also su¢ cient for ex post implementation. We also
provide a su¢ cient condition - ex post monotonicity no veto - for non-economic environments.
Section 5 considers an important class of single crossing environments; we show that ex post
monotonicity is satis￿ed in all single crossing environments if the social allocation problem satis￿es
strict rather than weak ex post incentive constraints. Section 6 provides su¢ cient conditions under
which ex post implementation is possible in the direct mechanism. Section 7 considers the single
unit auction environment. It is an important example as it fails Maskin monotonicity and has weak
ex post incentive constraints almost everywhere; yet it satis￿es ex post monotonicity and ex post
implementation is possible in the direct mechanism. Section 8 presents a Pareto social choice set
with the converse implementation properties. It satis￿es Maskin monotonicity but fails ex post
monotonicity. Section 9 extends the analysis to mixed strategy implementation and the use of
stochastic mechanisms. Section 10 concludes.
2 Model
We ￿x a ￿nite set of agents, 1;2;:::;I. Agent i￿ s type is ￿i 2 ￿i. We write ￿ 2 ￿ = ￿1 ￿ ::: ￿ ￿I.
There is a set of outcomes Y . Each agent has utility function ui : Y ￿ ￿ ! R. Thus we are in the
world of interdependent values, where an agent￿ s utility may depend on other agents￿types.6 A
5This follows from results in Bergemann & Morris (2004).
6We represent the preferences of the agents by utility functions rather than by preference relations as much of
the mechanism design literature with interdependent values uses utility functions rather than preferences. However,
all our results (with the exception of the mixed strategy implementation results in Section 9) only rely on ordinal
properties of the preferences and all results could be restated in terms of preferences rather than utility functions.Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 6
social choice function is a function from states to allocations, or f : ￿ ! Y . The set of all social
choice functions is F = ff jf : ￿ ! Y g. A social choice set F is a subset of F.7
In the tradition of the implementation literature, we describe the implementation problem here
for deterministic mechanisms and pure strategies. In Section 9 we extend the analysis to imple-
mentation to stochastic mechanisms and mixed strategies. We postpone the relevant modi￿cations
to accommodate mixed strategies until then.
A planner must choose a game form or mechanism for the agents to play in order to determine
the social outcome. Let mi be a message of agent i, Mi be the set of messages available to i and a
message pro￿le is denoted by m = (m1;m2;:::;mI) 2 M = ￿I
i=1Mi. Let g : M ! Y be the outcome
function and g (m) = y be a speci￿c outcome if message pro￿le m is chosen. Thus a mechanism is
a collection:
M = (M1;:::;MI;g (￿)):
Until Section 9, we make no additional assumptions on the structure of the type space ￿, the
outcome space Y , or the message space M:
For the given environment, we can combine the type space ￿ with a mechanism M to get an
incomplete information game (￿;M). We wish to analyze the ex post equilibria of the incomplete
information game (￿;M). A pure strategy in this game is a function si : ￿i ! Mi.
De￿nition 1 (Ex post equilibrium)
A pure strategy pro￿le s￿ = (s￿
1;:::;s￿
I) is an ex post equilibrium if










for all i, ￿ and mi.
An ex post equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium for every type pro￿le ￿. We observe that the
notion of an ex post equilibrium does not refer to prior or posterior probability distributions of
the types as the Bayes-Nash equilibrium does. The ex post equilibrium has an ex post no regret
property in the incomplete information game, as no agent would like to change his message even if
he were to know the true type pro￿le of the remaining agents.8
This is made precise in Section 4.
7In the literature on complete information implementation, it is customary to use social choice correspondences
(see Maskin (1999)) whereas in the literature on incomplete information implementation (see Postlewaite & Schmei-
dler (1986) and Jackson (1991)) it is customary to use social choice sets. We shall discuss some of the issues regarding
ex post implementation of functions, sets and correspondences in Section 8 in conjunction with the Pareto correspon-
dence.
8Ex post incentive compatibility was discussed as "uniform incentive compatibility" by Holmstrom and Myerson
(1983). Ex post equilibrium is increasingly studied in game theory (see Kalai (2002)) and is often used in mechanism
design as a more robust solution concept (see Cremer and McLean (1985) and the references in footnote 1).Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 7
In an environment with private values, the notion of ex post incentive compatibility is equivalent
to the notion of dominant strategy incentive compatibility. If in addition one could guarantee strict
dominant strategy incentive compatibility, then full implementation can be achieved by ￿at. The
importance of the distinction between weak and strict incentive compatibility for implementation
will be discussed in detail in the context of the single unit auction in Section 7. Results about
the private value special case and dominant strategy incentive compatibility are collected in the
Appendix.
De￿nition 2 (Ex Post Implementation)
Social choice set F is ex post implementable (in pure strategies) if there exists a mechanism M
such that:
1. for every f 2 F; there exists an ex post equilibrium s￿ of the game M that satis￿es:
g (s￿ (￿)) = f (￿), 8￿ 2 ￿;
2. for every ex post equilibrium s￿ of the game there exists f 2 F such that:
g (s￿ (￿)) = f (￿); 8￿ 2 ￿.
Implementation then requires that the equilibria of the mechanism exactly coincide with the
given social choice set. The notion of implementation de￿ned above is sometimes referred to as
￿full￿implementation (see Dasgupta, Hammond & Maskin (1979), Maskin (1999) and Postlewaite
& Schmeidler (1986)).
3 Monotonicity
3.1 Ex Post Monotonicity
Implementation is meant to address the problem that privately informed agents may consistently
misrepresent their information and jointly establish equilibrium behavior which fails to realize the
social choice objective of the planner. The notion of ex post monotonicity is easiest to grasp by
considering the direct revelation game. If we were just interested in partially implementing F -
i.e., constructing a mechanism with an ex post equilibrium achieving a selection f 2 F - then by
the revelation principle we could restrict attention to the direct mechanism and a necessary and
su¢ cient condition is the following ex post incentive compatibility condition.Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 8
De￿nition 3 (Ex Post Incentive Compatibility)
F is ex post incentive compatible (EPIC) if for every f 2 F :










for all i, ￿ and ￿0
i.
In the direct mechanism, a misrepresentation by an agent is a non-truthtelling strategy. As
such it is an attempt by the agent to deceive the designer and we refer to such a misrepresentation
as a deception ￿i by agent i:
￿i : ￿i ! ￿i.
The deception ￿i represents i￿ s reported type as a function of his true type. The entire pro￿le of
deceptions is denoted by:
￿(￿) = (￿1 (￿1);:::;￿I (￿I)):
In the direct mechanism, if agents report the deception ￿(￿) rather than truthfully report ￿, then
the resulting social outcome is given by f (￿(￿)) rather than f (￿). We write f ￿ ￿(￿) , f (￿(￿)).
The notion of ex post monotonicity guarantees that there exists a whistle-blower (among the agents)
who (i) will alert the designer of deceptive behavior ￿ by receiving a reward for his alert; and (ii)
will not falsely report a deception in a truth-telling equilibrium.
De￿nition 4 (Ex Post Monotonicity)
Social choice set F satis￿es ex post monotonicity (EM) if for every f 2 F and deception ￿ with
f ￿ ￿ = 2 F, there exists i;￿ and y 2 Y such that






















i 2 ￿i. (2)
It is convenient to denote the set of allocations that make agent i worse o⁄ (relative to the
social choice function f) at all of his types, ￿0































Thus (2) can be replaced with the requirement that y 2 Y
f
i (￿￿i (￿￿i)). The set Y
f
i (￿￿i) depends
on the selection f 2 F and is referred to as the reward set. It is the set of allocations which can
be used to reward the whistle-blower without upsetting the truthtelling equilibrium realizing theEx Post Implementation March 25, 2005 9
social choice function f. If the social choice objective is a function rather than a set than we can
omit the superscript on the reward set for notational ease. We refer to the subset of the reward set
which also satis￿es the reward inequality (1) as the successful reward set and denote it by Y ￿
i (￿￿i).
The de￿nition of ex post monotonicity suggests a rather intuitive description as to why monotonic-
ity is a necessary condition for implementation. Suppose that some selection f 2 F is ex post
implementable. Then if the agents were to deceive the designer by misreporting ￿(￿) rather than
reporting truthfully ￿ and if the deception ￿(￿) would lead to an allocation outside of the social
choice set, i.e. f ￿ ￿ = 2 F, then the designer should be able to fend o⁄ the deception. This requires
that there is some agent i and pro￿le ￿ such that the designer can o⁄er agent i a reward y for
denouncing the deception ￿(￿) if the true type pro￿le is ￿. Yet, the designer has to be aware that
the reward could be used in the wrong circumstances, namely when the true type pro￿le of the
remaining agents is ￿￿i (￿￿i) and truthfully reported to be ￿￿i (￿￿i). The strict inequality (1) then
guarantees the existence of a whistle-blower, whereas the weak inequalities (2) guarantee ex post
incentive compatible behavior by the whistle-blower.
3.2 Maskin Monotonicity
Maskin (1999) introduced a celebrated monotonicity notion which is a necessary and almost su¢ -
cient condition for complete information implementation. In the complete information environment,
each agent i is assumed to know the entire type pro￿le ￿ rather than just his private type ￿i. In
consequence, report and deception of each individual agent pertain to the entire type pro￿le ￿ 2 ￿,
or:
￿i : ￿ ! ￿:
With complete information, it is easy to detect individual deceptions and hence it su¢ ces to
consider collective and coordinated deceptions in which all agents pursue a common deception
strategy, ￿i = ￿, for all i.
De￿nition 5 (Maskin Monotonicity)
Social choice set F satis￿es Maskin monotonicity (MM) if for every f 2 F; ￿ and ￿ with f ￿￿(￿) = 2
^ f (￿) for all ^ f 2 F, there exists i and y 2 Y such that
ui (y;￿) > ui (f (￿(￿));￿); (4)
while
ui (f (￿(￿));￿(￿)) ￿ ui (y;￿(￿)): (5)Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 10
We state the notion of Maskin monotonicity in such a way as to facilitate a simple comparison
with ex post monotonicity. Typically, Maskin monotonicity is de￿ned for social choice correspon-
dences rather than social choice sets. If we start with a social choice correspondence ￿ : ￿ ! 2Y ￿
?,
then we can de￿ne an associated social choice set F = ff jf : ￿ ! Y g by including all social choice
functions f which select at all pro￿les allocations in the image of the correspondence:
F = ff jf (￿) 2 ￿(￿); 8￿ 2 ￿g.
We compare the notions of social choice set and correspondence in more detail in Section 8.
Comparing ex post and Maskin monotonicity, it may initially appear that ex post monotonicity







i 2 ￿i rather than just at ￿(￿). Thus (2) is stronger requirement than (5) because the incomplete
information reward set Y
f
i (￿￿i) is (weakly) contained in the complete information counterpart
Y
f
i (￿) = fy : ui (f (￿);￿) ￿ ui (y;￿)g.
The complete information reward set depends on the entire pro￿le ￿ rather than the pro￿le ￿￿i of
all agents but i. This di⁄erence in the reward sets arises from the informational assumption. With
complete information, all individual deceptions can easily be detected and the designer only needs
to worry about coordinated misrepresentations by all the agents. In the incomplete information
environment, agent i has private information about ￿0
i and hence incentive compatibility is required
to hold for all types ￿0
i 2 ￿i.
But for either ex post or Maskin monotonicity, we need a preference reversal relative to the
allocation f (￿(￿)). If the behavior of the incomplete information reward set Yi (￿￿i (￿￿i)) is locally
similar to the complete information set Yi (￿(￿)), then the di⁄erence between them may not matter
for implementation purposes. Indeed, we will show that in the important class of single crossing
environments, ex post and Maskin monotonicity coincide. We will illustrate this coincidence in the
public good example that follows. But this gap in reward sets may have important implications.
While the Pareto correspondence is always Maskin monotonic, we will later give an example showing
that it is not always ex post monotonic.
But outside the single crossing environment, ex post monotonicity is not necessarily a stronger
notion than Maskin monotonicity. In the complete information environment, the agents are (im-
plicitly) allowed to perfectly coordinate their misrepresentation for every societal type pro￿le ￿. In
contrast, in the incomplete information world, agent i has to deceive, i.e. determine ￿i : ￿i ! ￿i,
independently of the type pro￿le of the other agents. For this reason, it is strictly more di¢ cult
to ￿nd a reward y for Maskin monotonicity than for ex post monotonicity. In other words, the
independent choice of deception ￿i leads to a strictly smaller number of feasible deceptions ￿ inEx Post Implementation March 25, 2005 11
the incomplete information context. In the context of a single unit auction with interdependent
valuations, this second di⁄erence will enable us to show that the single unit auction can be imple-
mented in ex post equilibrium, yet fails to be implementable in complete information, and hence
fails Maskin monotonicity.
3.3 Public Good Example
We will illustrate ex post monotonicity, and the relation to Maskin monotonicity, with the following








Ax + ti; (6)
where x is the level of public good provided and ti is the monetary transfer to agent i. The
utility of agent i depends on his own type ￿i 2 [0;1] and the type pro￿le of other agents, with
￿ ￿ 0. The cost of establishing the public good is given by c(x) = 1
2x2. The planner must choose
(x;t1;:::;tI) 2 R+ ￿ RI to maximize social welfare, i.e., the sum of gross utilities minus the cost of
the public good:  









The socially optimal level of the public good is therefore equal to




The social choice set F can then be described by:
F =
(










where the level of the public good is determined uniquely, but the designer is unrestricted in his
choice of transfers. By standard arguments, ex post incentive compatibility pins down the levels of
transfers9:
















9In this example, and in interdependent public good problems with more general function forms, it is possible
to ￿nd ex post incentive compatible transfers for all values of ￿ ￿ 0. This can be established using conditions in
Bergemann & Valimaki (2002). This contrasts with the case of allocating a private good with interdependent values,
where ex post incentive compatibility puts an upper bound on the amount of interdependence (Dasgupta & Maskin
(2000)). However, Fieseler, Kittsteiner & Moldovanu (2003) point out that negative interdependence, or ￿ < 0,
relaxes the ex post incentive constraints in the private good problem.Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 12
The complete information reward set Yi (￿) is now characterized by an indi⁄erence curve in the
(x;ti) space. With the linear preferences here it is simply a straight line. The reward set is given
by the set of allocations below the indi⁄erence curve. In contrast, the incomplete information
reward set Yi (￿￿i) is characterized by the intersection of the reward sets for all ￿0

























The respective reward sets are depicted for I = 3;￿ = 1
4; and ￿i = 1
4 for all i in Figure 1 (setting
hi (￿￿i) = ti (0;￿￿i) = 0 for all ￿￿i).
Insert Figure 1: Reward Sets Yi (￿) and Yi (￿￿i).
The crucial observation is now that the slope of the boundary of the set Yi (￿￿i) at ￿ = (￿i;￿￿i)
is identical to the slope of the boundary of the set Yi (￿). In other words, locally, the slope of the
boundary of Yi (￿￿i) is determined by the preferences of type ￿. It then follows that if we can
guarantee preference reversal at the allocation f (￿(￿)), essentially the crossing of the indi⁄erence
curves for ￿ and ￿(￿), then the indi⁄erence curve of type ￿ will also cross with the boundary of
the set Yi (￿￿i). This is illustrated with ￿i = 3
4 and ￿i (￿i) = 1
4 for all i in Figure 2.
Insert Figure 2: Successful Reward Sets.
This basic insight allows us later to conclude that despite the additional incentive constraints
imposed by the ex post monotonicity condition, the single crossing environment by itself is strong
enough to guarantee the ex post monotonicity condition. The only modi￿cation we need is to
strengthen the necessary condition from weak to strict ex post incentive compatibility.
4 Ex Post Implementation
We present necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a social choice set F to be ex-post implementable.
Our results extend the work of Maskin (1999) for complete information implementation and of
Postlewaite & Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey & Srivastava (1989a) and Jackson (1991) on Bayesian
implementation to the notion of ex post equilibrium.
4.1 Necessary Conditions
Ex post incentive and monotonicity conditions are necessary conditions for ex post implementation.Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 13
Theorem 1 (Necessity)
If F is ex post implementable, then it satis￿es (EPIC) and (EM).
Proof. Let (M;g) implement F. Fix any f 2 F. By the implementation hypothesis, there
must exist an equilibrium s = (s1;:::sI), each si : ￿i ! Mi such that f = g ￿ s. Consider any
i;￿0
i 2 ￿i. Since s is an equilibrium,






























Now ￿x any deception ￿ with f ￿￿ = 2 F. It must be that s￿￿ is not an equilibrium at some ￿ 2 ￿.
Therefore there exists i and mi 2 Mi such that we have
ui (g (mi;s￿i (￿￿i (￿￿i)));￿) > ui (g (s(￿(￿)));￿):
Let y , g (mi;s￿i (￿￿i (￿￿i))). Then, from above,
ui (y;￿) > ui (f (￿(￿));￿):











































This establishes the incentive compatibility of the whistle-blower, or y 2 Y
f
i (￿￿i (￿￿i)).
We de￿ned ex post monotonicity in terms of the type pro￿les and associated utility functions.
As ex post monotonicity is the central condition in the subsequent analysis, we want to verify, as
promised earlier, that ex post monotonicity is nonetheless an ordinal rather than a cardinal concept.
De￿nition 6 (Ordinality)
The types ￿i and ￿0
i are ordinally equivalent (￿i ￿ ￿0
i) if for all j, ￿￿i 2 ￿￿i, y and y0,



















In other words, any two types of agent i, ￿i and ￿0
i, are ordinally equivalent if the ranking of
any pair of alternatives by any agent and for any pro￿le of agents other than i remain unchanged.
With interdependent values, it is important that the ranking remains unchanged not only for agent
i but for all other agents as well.Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 14
De￿nition 7 (Ordinal Social Choice Set)
Social choice set F is ordinal if f 2 F and ￿j (￿j) ￿ ￿j for all j and ￿j imply f ￿ ￿ 2 F.
A social choice set is hence called ordinal if for any two pro￿les, ￿ and ￿(￿), which only di⁄er
by ordinally equivalent types, the corresponding allocations remain in the social choice set.
Lemma 1
If F satis￿es ex post monotonicity, then F is ordinal.
Proof. Suppose f 2 F and ￿j (￿j) ￿ ￿j for all j and ￿j and that
ui (f (￿(￿));￿(￿)) ￿ ui (y;￿(￿)).
By ordinality we have
ui (f (￿(￿));￿) ￿ ui (y;￿).
But if ex post monotonicity holds, we must have f ￿ ￿ 2 F.
We proceed by ￿rst showing that in a wide class of environments, to be referred to as economic
environments, ex post incentive and monotonicity conditions are also su¢ cient conditions for ex
post implementation. We then present weaker su¢ ciency conditions, in the spirit of the conditions
used in Bayesian implementation, to obtain positive results outside of economic environments.
4.2 Su¢ cient Conditions in Economic Environments
The su¢ ciency arguments - for both the economic and the non-economic environment - will rely on
the use of an augmented mechanism. The mechanism suggested here is similar to the one used to
establish su¢ ciency in the complete information implementation literature (e.g., Maskin (1999)).
Each agent sends a message of the form mi = (￿i;fi;zi;yi), where ￿i is the reported type, fi is the
social choice function suggested by i, zi is a positive integer from the set I = f1;2;:::;Ig and yi is
the reward claimed by i. The set of feasible messages for agent i is given by:
Mi = ￿i ￿ F ￿ I ￿ Y .
The mechanism is described by three rules:
Rule 1. If fi = f for all i, then g (m) = f (￿).
Rule 2. If there exists j and f such that fi = f for all i 6= j while fj 6= f, then outcome yj is
chosen if yj 2 Y
f
j (￿￿j); otherwise outcome f (￿) is chosen.Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 15






We refer to the mechanism described by Rule 1-3 as the augmented mechanism. A strategy









2 ￿i ￿ F ￿ I ￿ Y ;





i=1. We observe that if Y and ￿ are ￿nite, then the above mechanism is ￿nite.
Next we de￿ne the notion of an economic environment.
De￿nition 8 (Economic Environment)
An environment is economic in state ￿ 2 ￿ if, for every allocation y 2 Y , there exist i 6= j and
allocations yi and yj, such that
ui (yi;￿) > ui (y;￿);
and
uj (yj;￿) > uj (y;￿).
An environment is economic if it is economic in every state ￿ 2 ￿.
Theorem 2 (Economic Environment)
If I ￿ 3, the environment is economic, and F satis￿es (EPIC) and (EM), then F is ex post
implementable.
Proof. The proposition is proved in three steps, using the augmented mechanism.
Claim 1. Fix any f 2 F. There is an ex post equilibrium s with g (s(￿)) = f (￿) for all ￿.
Any strategy pro￿le s of the following form is an ex post equilibrium:
si (￿i) = (￿i;f;￿;￿).







if yi = 2 Y
f
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which is non-positive by (EPIC); if fi 6= f and yi 2 Y
f
i (￿￿i), then the payo⁄ gain is
ui (yi;(￿i;￿￿i)) ￿ ui (f (￿i;￿￿i);f (￿i;￿￿i)),
which is non-positive by the de￿nition of Y
f
i (￿￿i).
Claim 2. In any ex post equilibrium, there exists f 2 F such that s2
i (￿i) = f for all i and ￿i.
Suppose that for all f 2 F, there exists i and ￿i such that s2
i (￿i) 6= f. Then there exists ￿ such
that rule 1 does not apply in equilibrium.
First suppose that rule 2 applies at ￿, so that there exists j and f such that fi = f for all i 6= j.
Then any agent i 6= j of type ￿i who thought his opponents were types ￿￿i, could send a message of
the form mi = (￿;fi;zi;yi), with fi 6= f and i =
PI
k=1 zk and obtain utility ui (yi;￿). Thus we must
have ui (g (s(￿));￿) ￿ ui (y;￿) for all y and all i 6= j. This contradicts the economic environment
assumption.
Now suppose that rule 3 applies at ￿. Then every agent i of type ￿i who thought his opponents
were types ￿￿i, could send a message of the form mi = (￿;fi;zi;yi), with i =
PI
k=1 zk and obtain
utility ui (yi;￿). Thus we must have ui (g (s(￿));￿) ￿ ui (y;￿) for all y and i. This again contradicts
the economic environment assumption.
Claim 3. For any f 2 F and in any ex post equilibrium with s2
i (￿i) = f for all i and ￿i,
f ￿ s1 2 F.

















Now suppose that type ￿i of agent i believes that his opponents are of type ￿￿i and sends message
mi = (￿;fi;￿;y), with fi 6= f, while other agents send their equilibrium messages, then from the
de￿nition of g (￿) :
g (mi;s￿i (￿￿i)) = y;
so that:








= ui (g (s(￿));￿),
and this completes the proof of su¢ ciency.
The economic environment condition was used to show that in equilibrium, the suggested social
choice functions all have to agree: fi = f for all i. If not, then some agent j could pro￿tably change
his suggestion to fj 6= f and obtain a more desirable allocation than f. The economic environment
assumption guaranteed the existence of an agent j with a preferred allocation.Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 17
4.3 Su¢ ciency Conditions in Non-Economic Environments
We now establish su¢ cient conditions for ex post implementation outside of economic environments.
For simplicity, we focus on the implementation of social choice functions, rather than social choice
sets, in this section.
The ex post su¢ cient conditions are the natural complements of the conditions obtained earlier
for Bayesian implementation. But because only ex post utilities matter, they are more easily veri￿ed
than their Bayesian analogues. We show that a joint strengthening of Maskin monotonicity and ex
post monotonicity, together with a no veto condition, is su¢ cient for ex post implementation. In
Section 9 we permit random mechanisms, which will allow us to strengthen the su¢ cient conditions
presented here substantially.
Within the augmented mechanism there are essentially two ways in which the play of agents can
lead to equilibrium behavior outside of the social choice objective. At any pro￿le ￿ 2 ￿, the agents
can either misrepresent their true type and fail to alert the designer of the misrepresentation. Or,
some agents alert the designer and thus lead him to choose an allocation di⁄erent from f (￿). In the
former case, Rule 1 of the augmented mechanism applies whereas in latter case, either Rule 2 or
Rule 3 applies. With an economic environment, it was impossible that in any equilibrium Rule 2 or
Rule 3 would apply. It followed that in every equilibrium Rule 1 would apply at all pro￿les ￿ 2 ￿.
The ex post monotonicity condition then guaranteed that the equilibrium conformed with the social
choice set. As we abandon the assumption of an economic environment, we cannot anymore exclude
the possibility that in equilibrium either Rule 2 or Rule 3 might apply. In consequence, the su¢ cient
conditions have to account for these complications. There are now basically two ways to achieve
this goal. Either behavior under Rule 2 or Rule 3 can be made to conform with the social choice,
or a reward can be o⁄ered in the subset of pro￿les where Rule 1 applies. The su¢ cient condition
will contain both elements: either an application of a no veto condition will make behavior under
Rule 2 or Rule 3 consistent with the social choice objective or an ex post monotonicity condition
on subsets of ￿ guarantees that a reward can be o⁄ered.
The relevant no veto condition is simply the "no veto power" property of Maskin (1999).
De￿nition 9 (No Veto Power)
Social choice function f satis￿es no veto power at ￿ if, for any j, if ui (b;￿) ￿ ui (y;￿) for all y 2 Y
and i 6= j, then f (￿) = b.
Note that no veto power is vacuously true at ￿ if the environment is economic at ￿, since the
latter implies that the premise in the de￿nition is never satis￿ed.
Under either Rule 2 or Rule 3, (almost) every agent can change the outcome to his most
preferred outcome. If the candidate allocation under either rule is part of an equilibrium, it followsEx Post Implementation March 25, 2005 18
that at least I ￿1 (if Rule 2 applies and I if Rule 3 applies) agents rank the candidate allocation y
higher than any other allocation. The no veto power property guarantees that allocation y coincides
with the social choice set. In other words, the possibility of undesirable equilibrium behavior is
eliminated by no veto power. However, if the no veto power property fails, it might still be possible
to generate a reward on the set of pro￿les where Rule 1 applies. For any strategy pro￿le of the
agents, the set of pro￿les at which Rule 1 applies always satis￿es a product structure. Given a
strategy pro￿le of the agents, a subset ￿i identi￿es the types of agent i at which Rule 1 applies.
The product set ￿:
￿ , ￿I
i=1￿i;
is the set of pro￿les at which Rule 1 applies, and the complementary set ￿￿￿ at which either Rule
2 or Rule 3 applies. We state the su¢ cient condition combining ex post monotonicity on subsets
and the no veto power property. We state the conditions for the case of a social choice function
and the straightforward extension to general social choice sets is provided in the Appendix.
De￿nition 10 (Ex Post Monotonicity No Veto (EMNV))
Social choice function f satis￿es ex post monotonicity no veto if, for any deception ￿ and any
product set ￿ ￿ ￿, the following holds: If the environment is non-economic at each ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿,
then
1. f satis￿es no veto power on ￿ ￿ ￿;
2. if f (￿(￿)) 6= f (￿) for some ￿ 2 ￿ then there exists i, ￿ 2 ￿ and y such that























The strategy pro￿le of the agents could involve truthtelling on a subset ￿ (and appealing to Rule
1) or involve whistle-blowing and misrepresentation on the complementary set ￿ ￿ ￿ (and appeal
to Rule 2 or Rule 3). The su¢ cient condition guarantees that for all product sets ￿ an appropriate
reward can be found. The condition is weakened by the fact that we only need to consider those
subsets ￿ which guarantee that on the complementary subset ￿￿￿ all pro￿les are non-economic.
It follows that the smaller the set ￿ becomes (and hence restricting the ability of the designer to
o⁄er rewards), the more demanding is the requirement that all pro￿les are non-economic. This
then conceivably puts a bound on the number of sets for which the ex post monotonicity part of
the condition has to be veri￿ed.Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 19
Theorem 3 (Su¢ ciency)
For I ￿ 3, if f satis￿es (EPIC) and (EMNV ), then f is ex post implementable.
Proof. We use the same mechanism as before. The argument that there exists an ex post
equilibrium s with g (s(￿)) = f (￿) is the same as before. Now we establish three claims that hold
for all equilibria. Let
￿i = f￿i : si (￿i) = (￿;f;￿;￿)g:
Claim 1. In any ex post equilibrium, for each ￿ = 2 ￿, (a) there exists i such that uj (g (s(￿));￿) ￿
uj (y;￿) for all y and j 6= i; and thus (b) the environment is non-economic at ￿.
First, observe that for each ￿ = 2 ￿, there exists i such that s2
i (￿i) 6= f. Given the strategies
of the other agents, any agent j 6= i who thought his opponents were types ￿￿j could send any
message of the form
(￿;fj;zj;yj);
and obtain utility uj (yj;￿). Thus we must have uj (g (s(￿));￿) ￿ uj (y;￿) for all y and j 6= i; thus
the environment is non-economic for all ￿ = 2 ￿.
























and that type ￿i of agent i believes that
his opponents are of type ￿￿i and sends message mi = (￿;fi;zi;y), while other agents send their
equilibrium messages. Now
g (mi;s￿i (￿￿i)) = y;
so ex post equilibrium requires that








￿ ui (g (mi;s￿i (￿￿i));￿)
= ui (y;￿).
Claim 3. If EMNV is satis￿ed, then Claim 1 and 2 imply that g (s(￿)) = f (￿) for all ￿.
Fix any equilibrium. Claim 1(b) establishes that the environment is non-economic at all ￿ = 2
￿. Suppose g (s(￿)) 6= f (￿) for some ￿ 2 ￿. Now EMNV implies that there exists i, ￿ 2 ￿















, contradicting Claim 2. Suppose
g (s(￿)) 6= f (￿) for some ￿ = 2 ￿. By claim 1(a), there exists i such that uj (g (s(￿));￿) ￿ uj (y;￿)
for all y and j 6= i. This establishes that no veto power applies at ￿. So again EMNV implies that
g (s(￿)) = f (￿).Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 20
EMNV is almost equivalent to requiring ex post monotonicity and no veto power everywhere.
More precisely, we have:
1. If ex post monotonicity holds and no veto power holds at every type pro￿le ￿, then EMNV
holds.
2. If EMNV holds, then (1) ex post monotonicity holds and (2) if the environment is non-
economic whenever ￿i = ￿￿
i, then no veto power holds whenever ￿i = ￿￿
i. To see (1), set ￿i =
￿i for all i; to see (2), set ￿ to be the truth-telling deception and, for some i, ￿i = ￿inf￿￿
ig
and ￿j = ￿j for all j 6= i.
In an economic environment, we only have to verify ￿ = ￿. EMNV is then equivalent to ex post
monotonicity as the no veto condition is vacuously satis￿ed. On the other hand, if the environment
is non-economic at every pro￿le ￿ 2 ￿, then the EMNV condition simpli￿es considerably as it
su¢ ces to evaluate the hypothesis at the most restrictive sets, or ￿ = f￿g for every ￿ 2 ￿. In
particular, we can then state ex post monotonicity and no veto conditions separately.
De￿nition 11 (Local Ex Post Monotonicity (LEM))
f satis￿es local ex post monotonicity if for all ￿ and all ￿ such that f (￿(￿)) 6= f (￿), there exists i
and y with:






















i 2 ￿i. (9)
With LEM, the designer can o⁄er a reward y at every type pro￿le ￿ at which ￿ leads to a
di⁄erent allocation, or f (￿(￿)) 6= f (￿). In contrast, with ex post monotonicity it su¢ ces to ￿nd
some ￿ at which a reward y can be o⁄ered. The local version of ex post monotonicity is in fact
identical to Maskin monotonicity with the additional ex post incentive constraints (see (9)).
Corollary 1 (Su¢ ciency)
For I ￿ 3, if f satis￿es (EPIC), (LEM) and (NV P), then f is ex post implementable.
For a non-economic environment, the separate conditions of LEM and NV P are exactly identi-
cal to EM. If the environment is economic in some pro￿les but not all pro￿les, the joint conditions
are more restrictive than EMNV .Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 21
5 Single Crossing Environment
In this section we consider ex post implementation in single crossing environments. To make full
use of the crossing conditions, we restrict attention to social choice problems which recommend
allocations in the interior of the feasible set of Y . We show that under this mild restriction, single
crossing preferences are essentially su¢ cient to guarantee ex post monotonicity.
De￿nition 12 (Interior Social Choice Set)
Social choice set F is interior if for all f 2 F and for all ￿ 2 ￿;f (￿) 2 intY for all ￿ 2 ￿.
The interior condition is essential to use the full strength of the single crossing environment.
In this section we further assume that Y is a convex set and that ui (y;￿) is continuous in y at
all i and ￿. The convexity and continuity assumptions appear in establishing that locally, around
f (￿), it is only the single crossing condition with respect to the type pro￿le ￿, that matter for the
monotonicity inequalities. We ￿rst give a general de￿nition of preference reversal.
De￿nition 13 (Preference Reversal)
The environment is an environment with preference reversal if for all z 2 intY and all ￿;￿0 , every
open set O including z contains allocations y;y0 such that for some i:














The above de￿nition is weak in the sense that the preference reversal is required to occur only
for one rather than all agents. This weaker version is helpful as the type pro￿les of the agents
may sometimes interact so as to precisely o⁄set each other in their e⁄ect on the preferences of the
agents. We simple require that at two distinct pro￿les of society, ￿ and ￿0, there is at least one
agent with a preference reversal.10,11
10With interdependent values the change in the type pro￿le from ￿ to ￿
0 may o⁄set each other as can be easily
veri￿ed within the earlier public good example (see Section 3.3). For example we can keep the utility of agent i
constant as we move from ￿ to ￿
0, where ￿







￿j ￿ ￿", if j = i
￿k + ", if j = k
￿j, if j 6= i;k
:
Now i has identical preferences at ￿ and ￿
0, but it is easily veri￿ed that for all j 6= i, there is preference reversal.
11The condition can be weakened further: by requiring that each f 2 F satis￿es f (￿) = f (￿
0) if ui (￿;￿) = ui (￿;￿
0)
for all i, we can weaken the preference reversal condition to hold only at pro￿le pairs, ￿ and ￿
0, at which there exists
i such that ui (￿;￿) 6= ui (￿;￿
0).Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 22
As the above de￿nition of single crossing applies to general allocation spaces, it is phrased as
a preference reversal condition. In many applications of mechanism design, the allocation space
for each agent is two-dimensional, say the level of private or public good and a monetary transfer.
In this case, a su¢ cient condition for preference reversal is the well known intersection or single
crossing condition.
De￿nition 14 (Single Crossing)
The environment is a single crossing environment if for all z 2 intY , with Y ￿ R2, the indi⁄erence
curves for any two pro￿les ￿ and ￿0 generated by ui (z;￿) and ui
￿
z;￿0￿
intersect at z for some i.
We establish the positive implementation result for the environment given in De￿nition 13. We
should point out that the important feature of the single crossing environment with respect to
the monotonicity condition is the ￿crossing￿or ￿reversal￿aspect rather than the ￿single crossing￿
aspect. More precisely, in order to show that the monotonicity conditions are satis￿ed, we only
need to require that the indi⁄erence curves intersect at z but we do not need them to have a
unique intersection. By contrast, the uniqueness is of course helpful to establish the validity of the
incentive compatibility conditions.
With strictness and interiority of F, a local argument allows us to show that, even though
relative to Maskin monotonicity, ex post monotonicity imposes additional ex post incentive con-
straints, these additional constraints do not bind. In consequence, the set of dominated allocations
y is locally identical to the complete information set. For the local argument to go through, we
need to strengthen the ex post incentive constraints in the direct mechanism to strict rather than
weak inequalities.
De￿nition 15 (Strict Ex Post Incentive Compatibility)
Social choice set F is strictly ex post incentive compatible if for all f 2 F:









for all i, ￿ and ￿0
i 6= ￿i.
The public good example in Section 3.3 is an example where the (singleton) social choice set
satis￿es single crossing, strict EPIC and interiority.
Theorem 4 (Single Crossing)
In an environment with preference reversal, every strict ex post incentive compatible and interior
F satis￿es ex post monotonicity.Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 23
Proof. We start with the contrapositive version of ex post monotonicity, which can be stated





















































consider the indi⁄erence curve for ￿ and b ￿ at f (￿). Since the preferences are single crossing, there
is a sequence of allocations fyng
1
n=1 with limn!1 yn = f (￿) such that for all yn:











We shall now argue that for every ￿0























The proof is by contrapositive. Suppose now that (10) were not to hold, and that there exists ￿0
i










































But this violates the hypothesis of strict ex post incentive compatibility. We have thus shown that
the hypothesis in the de￿nition of ex post monotonicity is never satis￿ed and hence the implication
is never required. It follows that ex post monotonicity is vacuously satis￿ed in the single crossing
environment.
The public good example of Section 3 is an example where the (singleton) social choice set
satis￿es single crossing, strict EPIC and interiority. The idea of the proof is that with strict ex post
incentive compatibility, the set of allocations which are dominated by the social choice function is
locally (around f (￿)) determined by the preferences of the agents with type pro￿le ￿. The situation
is represented in Figure 3.
Insert Figure 3: Strict Ex Post Incentive CompatibilityEx Post Implementation March 25, 2005 24
If the ex post incentive constraint only holds as an equality for some types, say ￿i and ￿0
i, then
the set of allocations dominated by the social choice function is determined locally (around f (￿))
by the preferences of both types. In this case, the hypothesis of Maskin monotonicity may be
satis￿ed and hence become a constraint. The second situation is represented in Figure 4.
Insert Figure 4: Failure of Strict Ex Post Incentive Compatibility
A recent contribution by Arya, Glover & Rajan (2000) explores in the private value environ-
ment the relationship between Maskin and Bayesian monotonicity and the single crossing condition.
Interestingly, their su¢ ciency result regarding Bayesian monotonicity, also requires that the incen-
tive compatibility conditions in the direct mechanism are satis￿ed as strict inequalities. They also
present an example which shows that weak incentive compatibility and the single crossing condition
alone do not guarantee Bayesian monotonicity. Incidentally, and for the same reason as in Arya,
Glover & Rajan (2000) for the Bayesian incentive constraints, the strict ex post incentive compati-
bility condition actually allows a slightly stronger statement than actually stated in Proposition 4.
The single crossing and strict ex post incentive constraints also imply a strict ex post monotonicity
condition, where all the weak inequalities are replaced by strict inequalities.
The role of the interior assumption for the monotonicity condition has already been emphasized
in work by Hurwicz, Maskin & Postlewaite (1995). They presented an example of a Walrasian
social choice correspondence where the Walrasian allocation for a given preference pro￿le is on the
boundary of the feasibility set. Naturally then, the indi⁄erence curves generated by a second and
distinct set of preferences, intersect at the boundary. The crucial implication of the intersection at
the boundary is that the set of allocations for which the Maskin monotonicity hypothesis fails is
outside the feasible set, and hence Maskin monotonicity fails to hold.
6 Direct Mechanisms
In general, the ex post monotonicity conditions guarantee the existence of an incentive compatible
reward. With the preference reversal environment and the strict ex post incentive constraints, we
could establish that local changes in the report of the types are su¢ cient to establish the ex post
monotonicity conditions. This in fact suggests that preference reversal and strictness of the ex post
incentive constraints jointly guarantee implementation in the direct mechanism. We pursue this
insight and show that in many economically important circumstances ex post implementation can
be achieved in the direct mechanism. In consequence, the implementation does not have to rely on
the augmentation on which much of the positive implementation results in the literature rest.Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 25
By de￿nition, a direct mechanism cannot coordinate the selection of a particular social choice
function f from a set F. Hence, we restrict our attention in this section to the implementation of
a given social function f. The basic problem of implementation in the direct mechanism is that an
agent must be able to claim the reward y by a report, possibly a misreport, of his type. A su¢ cient
condition for direct implementation is therefore that for every allocation in the reward set Yi (￿￿i)
of agent i, another allocation y0 which is weakly preferred to y by agent i can be obtained by an
appropriate report of agent i0s type. In particular, if agent i can induce the choice of every y by
the social choice function f through an appropriate reward, then the direct mechanism o⁄ers all
the feasible rewards.
De￿nition 16 (Full Range)






Obviously, the full range condition is a very strong condition, but we shall now show that much
weaker conditions will su¢ ce in many environments. A common feature of many mechanism design
models is that the allocation problem has two dimensions, the ￿rst is the assignment of the object
and the second the monetary or quasi-monetary transfer. Within this two dimensional framework
we can obtain positive results for ex post implementation in the direct mechanism. We thus suppose
for the moment that the utility function of each agent permits the following representation:
ui (y;￿) = b ui (y0;yi;￿); (11)
where b ui is strictly increasing in yi, generalizing the monetary aspect in the quasilinear model. In
the remainder of this section we hence investigate the implementation of a given social function
f with f = (f0;f1;f2;:::fI), where the pair (f0;fi) represents the relevant two dimensions of the
allocation problem for agent i with Yi ￿ R for every i. We can now restrict the full range condition
to the single dimension of every agent i.
De￿nition 17 (One Dimensional Full Range)
Social choice function f satis￿es one dimensional full range if for all i, y0 2 Y0, ￿￿i 2 ￿￿i, there





With the monotone utility ^ ui in yi and the one dimensional full range condition we can indeed
guarantee direct implementation.
Proposition 1 (Direct Implementation with One Dimensional Full Range)
If f satis￿es (EPIC), (EM) and one dimensional full range, then direct ex post implementation
is possible.Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 26







































We now want to show that y 2 Yi (￿￿i) ) 9y0 2 Y ￿
i (￿￿i) such that ui (y0;￿) ￿ ui (y;￿) for all











































for all ^ ￿.
The full range condition together with the monotonicity in the utility essentially guarantees
that the agent can make a su¢ ciently large misreport to ￿nd an appropriate reward. The public
good example on Section 3 satis￿es the monotonicity condition and the one dimensional full range
condition if ￿i = R+. If we replace the monotonicity condition by the single crossing condition,
then a local change in the report is su¢ cient to guarantee the reward to the whistle-blower. The
type space ￿i for every agent i now has to be an open set so that a local change in the report is
always feasible.
Proposition 2 (Direct Implementation with Single Crossing)
In a single crossing environment, if ￿i is an open set for every i, and f is interior, continuous in
￿, and satis￿es strict EPIC, then f can be ex post implemented in the direct mechanism.
Proof. We ￿rst observe that with continuity, strict ex post incentive compatibility, and
monotonicity in the second argument, it must be the case that for all ￿i;￿0
i and ￿i 6= ￿0






. Suppose not, then by strict ex post incentive compatibility the allocations have at least





. But since ui (￿) is strictly increasing
in yi, it follows that this would violate the ex post incentive constraint for either ￿i or ￿0
i. It now
follows from continuity that f0 (￿i;￿￿i) must be monotone in ￿i for every ￿￿i.
We next show that the inequalities of ex post monotonicity can be satis￿ed for all ￿;￿0 and
that a reward y can always be obtained by means of an allocation which is generated by the social
choice function for some report e ￿i of agent i. Thus consider the indi⁄erence curve for ￿ and b ￿
at f (￿). Since the preferences are single crossing, there is a sequence of allocations fyng
1
n=1 with
limn!1 yn = f (￿) such that for all yn along the sequence

































The proof is by contrapositive. Suppose now that (13) were not to hold, and that there exists ￿0
i










































But this violates the hypothesis of strict ex post incentive compatibility. We have thus shown
that for an appropriately chosen subsequence of fyng
1
n=1, converging to y = f (￿), all the elements
satisfy (12) and (13).
By continuity and monotonicity of f (￿), it follows that we can ￿nd a type ^ ￿i of agent i an




= ^ y0. By monotonicity of ui (￿) in yi and the validity of




￿ ^ yi. Again by monotonicity




is at least as desirable for agent i as ^ y. Thus agent




to ^ y. But now it follows that agent i can claim the reward
simply by reporting ^ ￿i in the direct mechanism without appealing to the augmented mechanism
where he would claim ^ y.
The public good example on Section 3 satis￿es the condition of Proposition 2 provided the type
space ￿i is open for every i.
The openness condition on the type space ￿i simply guarantees that agent i can always ￿down-
ward￿and ￿upward￿misreport and obtain a suitable reward y. It follows that we can easily relax
the openness condition and obtain a quasi direct implementation by means of the following con-
struction. For any given type space ￿i, if we can ￿nd an open set ￿i such that ￿i ￿ ￿i and the
single crossing conditions extend to ￿i, then we can directly apply the argument of Proposition
2 to the extended space ￿ = ￿I
i=1￿i. Moreover, in equilibrium the agents will report only types
￿ 2 ￿ belonging to the original type space.
Finally, we can directly capture the idea that a small change in the report is su¢ cient to claim
a successful reward. For every agent i, let the type space be a subset of the real line, or ￿i ￿ R.Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 28
We say that an agent i has reactive preferences if all agents weakly overstate their type, and at
least one agent strictly overstates his type, then we can ￿nd an agent who would like to report his
true type rather than overstate his type.
De￿nition 18 (Reactive Preferences)










































The notion of reactive preferences might be weakened to simply require that for all ￿ ￿ ￿0, there
exists i and ￿00
i with ￿00
i < ￿0






















holds. The notion of reactive preferences is stated for general utility functions, and does not require
the earlier monotonicity or separability conditions of (11).
Proposition 3 (Direct Implementation with Reactive Preferences)
If the agents have reactive preferences and the type space is compact, then every strict ex post
incentive compatible f can be ex post implemented in the direct mechanism.





, is given by a compact interval. Suppose in the direct mechanism there is an ex
post equilibrium s￿ = (s￿
1;:::;s￿
I) such that for some agent i and some type ￿i, we have s￿
i (￿i) 6= ￿i.









at which all agents, but not necessarily i, have the lowest possible type. By strict ex post incentive
compatibility, it follows that at ￿i, there must at least exist one more agent, say j, who misreports




> ￿j. But with reactive
preferences (see inequality (14)), this reporting pro￿le cannot form an ex post equilibrium.
It can again be veri￿ed that the public good example of Section 3 satis￿es the condition of
Proposition 3 provided the type space ￿i is compact for every i.
We also observe that Proposition 3 does not require the single crossing environment nor the
interiority condition. In fact, the proof relies on the strictness of the ex post incentive constraintsEx Post Implementation March 25, 2005 29
and the fact that with a compact type space there is a smallest and largest type for every agent.
The notion of reactive preferences is of special interest as it includes the supermodular environment




The notion of supermodularity adopted here is slightly stronger than typically used in the mecha-
nism design literature, where the cross derivative is supposed to hold for agent i only with respect
to his own signal, but not with respect to the signal of the other agents. With the supermodular
environment, every ex post incentive compatible allocation x has to be (weakly) increasing in ￿i.
The extension to all agent-signal pairs (i;j) is important in our context to guarantee the reactive-
























for all ￿i < ￿0




























from which the inequality (14) follows directly.
7 Single Unit Auction
We consider the e¢ cient social choice rule in the single unit auction with interdependent values as
in Dasgupta & Maskin (2000). The auction model presents an interesting environment as it fails
both the strict ex post incentive compatibility condition as well as the interiority condition. The
assignment of the object among the agents changes only at pivotal types. As it stays constant for
many reported types, it satis￿es weak but not strict ex post incentive compatibility. The e¢ cient
assignment problem is also a canonical example of an exterior social choice function as for almost
all preferences pro￿les, one agent receives the object with probability one and all other agents
receive the object with probability zero. Despite the failure of the model to satisfy the conditions
of Theorem 4, we will show that the local violations of strict ex post incentive compatibility and
interior allocation can be overcome to establish implementation in ex post equilibrium, in particular
by the direct mechanism. Incidentally, the local failure of these conditions leads to a failure of
Maskin monotonicity when ex post monotonicity is still guaranteed.Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 30
7.1 Model
The utility function of agent i in the assignment problem is given by:
ui (xi;ti;￿) = xivi (￿) + ti,
where xi is the probability that agent i receives the object, ti is his monetary payment and vi (￿)







The ￿rst condition simply says that a higher signal by i leads to a higher value of i and the second
condition guarantees that we are in an interdependent rather than private value environment. The
single crossing condition is, as in Dasgupta & Maskin (2000), that for all i;j and ￿, if










In other words, if i and j tie for the largest value, then the marginal value of a higher type ￿i is
higher for agent i than for agent j. In addition, we shall restrict our attention to a symmetric
environment and a compact type space ￿i = [0;1]. In other words, for all i;j and all ￿, we assume
vi (￿i;￿j;￿￿ij) = vj (￿j;￿i;￿￿ij);
We consider the e¢ cient allocation rule and in case of a tie at the top, we assign the object with
equal probability among the agents with the highest valuation. The ex post incentive compatible
transfer rule is of the form:
ti (￿) = ￿vi (￿i;￿￿i); (17)


















We refer to the e¢ cient direct mechanism satisfying (17) as the generalized Vickrey Clark Groves
(VCG) mechanism.Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 31
7.2 Monotonicity and the VCG Mechanism
We present three results in this section. We ￿rst show that the generalized VCG mechanism satis￿es
the ex post monotonicity condition. In fact the positive result is strengthened to obtain ex post
implementation in the direct mechanism. We then show that even though ex post monotonicity is
satis￿ed, Maskin monotonicity fails.
Proposition 4 (Ex Post Monotonicity)
1. For I ￿ 3; the generalized VCG mechanism satis￿es ex post monotonicity.
2. For I ￿ 3, the direct generalized VCG mechanism has a unique pure ex post equilibrium.
Proof. By Theorem 1, ex post monotonicity is a necessary condition for ex post implementation.
It is therefore su¢ cient to show that the generalized VCG mechanism can be ex post implemented.
We show that the unique equilibrium in the direct mechanism is the truthtelling equilibrium.
Suppose not and there exists another ex post equilibrium. It follows that for some agent i and
some type pro￿le ￿i, we have that si (￿i) 6= ￿i. We de￿ne the highest possible type across all agents
for which we observe a report di⁄erent from truthtelling:
￿ = max
i2I
supf￿i 2 ￿i jsi (￿i) 6= ￿ig. (18)
We suppose initially that
supf￿i 2 ￿i jsi (￿i) 6= ￿ig = maxf￿i 2 ￿i jsi (￿i) 6= ￿ig,
for all i 2 I, which we shall later relax.














< ￿ < ￿j. At ￿j, we know from (18), that sj (￿j) = ￿j. It follows that at the type pro￿le
(￿i;￿￿i) and associated reports, all agents j 6= i receive the object with the same probability but











￿i = ￿;￿j = ￿ + "
￿
, (19)
which is strictly below the value of the object for agent j. It follows that every agent j 6= i has
a unilateral pro￿table deviation by reporting a higher type ￿0
j > ￿j. With the higher report, he
will still pay the same transfer (per unit) by the VCG mechanism, but agent j will then receive
the object with probability one. By (19), the net utility of the transaction is strictly positive and
hence agent j strictly increases his payo⁄ with the deviation.Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 32









for all other agents j 6= i, ￿j = ￿ + " for some arbitrarily small " > 0. At this pro￿le ￿i = ￿ and
￿j = ￿ + ", agent i receives the object under the deception but at a transfer which is larger than











￿i = ￿;￿j = ￿ + "
￿
: (20)
It follows that by reporting a su¢ ciently low type pro￿le so that he will not receive the object and
receive a zero transfer, he can guarantee himself a zero net utility which is a strict improvement
about his candidate negative net utility as displayed in (20).




< ￿ has to hold. We observe ￿rst that at most one agent i
can o⁄er a downward biased report in equilibrium. If more than one agent would downward report
at ￿j = 1, then each one of the downward reporting agents would have a strict incentive to report
the maximal type ￿j = 1, as the monetary transfer (per unit) would be strictly less than the value
of the object. It thus follows that all agents j 6= i report truthfully at ￿j = 1, for otherwise they
would downward report and then agent i would always have a strict incentive to recover his bid
and report truthfully.
By the same argument, it also follows that no agent other than i can ever downward report at














< ￿j, agent i would again have a strict incentive to report truthfully as the downward
report by agent j leads to a transfer payment strictly less than the true value of the object. It
hence follows that for all agents j 6= i we only have to consider truthtelling or upward deceptions.
With agent i downward reporting at ￿i = 1, we now argue that at least one agent j 6= i has
to consistently upward report for all ￿j 2 (si (1);1). For suppose not, then we can ￿nd some type
pro￿le ￿￿i with ￿j 2 (si (1);1) for all j 6= i, such that all agents j report truthfully. But at such
a type pro￿le agent i would loose with his report of si (1), when he values the object higher than
everybody else and would have to pay a transfer strictly less than the value of the object to him. As
this cannot be an equilibrium strategy pro￿le, it follows that at least one agent most consistently
misreport upwardly.
We ￿nally argue that this cannot be an equilibrium strategy pro￿le for agent j either. To see
this consider the true pro￿le ￿i = 0 for agent i. At ￿i = 0, agent i cannot downward report, at least
he has to report truthfully, and by the earlier argument all the other agents also report at least








now the type pro￿le ￿ =
￿











. In other words, at type pro￿le ￿ all
agents but i and j have a true type exactly equal to the reported pro￿le of agent j. It follows thatEx Post Implementation March 25, 2005 33
either agent j receives the object with positive probability at ￿ or that he looses out as some other
agent, say k, di⁄erent from i and j also misreports upwardly. But in either case, agent j or agent k
will have to pay more than the object is worth to them. It follows that either the candidate strategy
of agent j or k o⁄ers a pro￿table deviation by su¢ ciently lowering the report so that either j or k
fails to get the object, receives a zero transfer and guarantees himself a zero net utility. We thus
have obtained a contradiction to a candidate equilibrium involving a downward report at ￿ = 1.
It remains to consider the situation where
￿ = max
i2I
supf￿i 2 ￿i jsi (￿i) 6= ￿ig 6= max
i2I
maxf￿i 2 ￿i jsi (￿i) 6= ￿ig;
for some i. By de￿nition of ￿, for every " > 0, we can then ￿nd an agent i and a type ￿i, such that














For ￿ = 1, we can still ￿nd for every " > 0, an agent i and a type ￿i, such that 1￿" < ￿i < 1, and
si (￿i) 6= ￿i. If for all such ￿i, we have si (￿i) < ￿i, then the above argument goes through without
modi￿cations. The remaining possibility is that for all " > 0, and ￿i satisfying 1 ￿ " < ￿i < 1,
we have si (￿i) > ￿i. But this cannot be part of an equilibrium either because at the pro￿le
￿ = (￿i;1;1;:::;1), all agents j 6= i report by assumption truthfully, but with si (￿i) > ￿i, every
agent j would pay a transfer strictly exceeding the value of the object. Thus, we have excluded all
other candidate ex post equilibria which involve misreporting for some agents at some type pro￿les.
The idea behind the proof is quite simply and relies essentially on interdependent rather than
private valuations. Essentially we used two reward schemes. We either gave a currently winning
agent the object with probability one at the current price or we released the current winner, i.e. did
not give him the object and gave him a zero transfer. These rewards can be (implicitly) claimed in
the direct mechanism. If an agent k ￿nds it pro￿table to receive the object with probability one,
then he can do so in the direct mechanism by slightly increasing his reported type. If an agent k
would like not to receive the object, then he could always guarantee this by lowering his announced
type pro￿le.
This basic argument highlights the role of pivotal pro￿les at which an increase or decrease in
the reported type leads to a change in the allocation. At type pro￿les at which the auctioneer
is indi⁄erent between assigning the object among two or more agents, the pivotal or competitive
pro￿les, two important things happened. First, the allocation rule is now in the interior as the
auctioneer awards the object to competitive bidders with the same probability. Second, even
though at the competitive pro￿le, the ex post incentive constraints are only weak inequalities, in
any neighborhood of the competitive pro￿le, we can ￿nd strict ex post incentive constraints. InEx Post Implementation March 25, 2005 34
light of the earlier results on the single crossing environment, notably Theorem 4, we then ￿nd
that it is the existence of pivotal pro￿les which matters for ex post implementation rather than the
everywhere strictness of the ex post incentive constraints.
In this respect, we should point out that the role of the symmetric valuations is precisely to
facilitate the location of pivotal pro￿les ￿. The proof of Proposition 4 would go through unchanged
if we were to abandon symmetry everywhere except at the lowest and highest type pro￿les, or at
￿ = (0;:::;0) and ￿ = (1;:::;1). In fact, the only property of the symmetry at the bottom and the
top we really need, is that for every type pro￿le ￿i of agent i, there exists another agent j and
type pro￿le ￿￿i such that j is competitive with respect to i at ￿ = (￿i;￿￿i). Hence a di⁄erent
su¢ cient condition for ex post implementation in the single unit auction model would be the full
range condition introduced in Section 5.
Despite the positive ex post implementation results, the generalized VCG mechanism fails
Maskin monotonicity. Indeed, the generalized VCG mechanism is an important example where
the two monotonicity notions fail to coincide.
Proposition 5 (Maskin Monotonicity)
The generalized VCG mechanism fails Maskin monotonicity.
Proof. Consider a pro￿le ￿ such that
vi (￿) > vj (￿); 8j 6= i.
Then by the single crossing conditions (15) and (16) we can ￿nd ￿0 with
￿0










It then follows that




We now recall that a social choice function f is Maskin monotone, if for all ￿;￿0 2 ￿ :







for all i and y, then
f (￿) = f
￿
￿0￿
. (22)Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 35
We can verify that the implication (21) holds for all i and y, but the conclusion to be drawn,
f (￿) = f
￿
￿0￿
, obviously fails as the transfers o⁄ered to agent i have to be di⁄erent to guarantee
incentive compatibility.
We should add that there are transfer rules which satisfy Maskin monotonicity, but neces-
sarily fail ex post incentive compatibility. For example, a constant transfer rule satis￿es Maskin
monotonicity, but obviously is not ex post incentive compatible. Yet as Maskin monotonicity is
concerned with complete information environments, this may be less of a concern for the notion of
Maskin monotonicity.
The existence rather than ubiquitousness of the pivotal pro￿les also underlies the di⁄erence
between ex post and Maskin monotonicity. With ex post monotonicity we can search for a com-
petitive pro￿le among all types of agent i given the type pro￿le of the other agents, whereas with
Maskin monotonicity and the inherent synchronicity of complete information, we cannot do that.
In particular, the fact that for most type pro￿les we are at the exterior of the allocation space is a
problem for Maskin, but not necessarily for ex post monotonicity. Provided that the social choice
function is at least sometimes in the interior we can use the single crossing condition at the interior
pro￿les.
This basic intuition as to why ex post monotonicity holds, but Maskin monotonicity fails are
next presented graphically. For simplicity, the illustrations are based on the following linear model:
vi (￿) = ￿i + ￿
X
j6=i
￿j; 0 < ￿ < 1; (23)
and I = 3.
We begin with Maskin monotonicity and consider the pro￿le ￿ = (1;0;0) and associated de-






. In this deception, agent 1 understates his type and agent 2











. The reward sets for agent 1 and agent 2 and 3 are depicted below in
Figure 5A and 5B respectively. We then ask whether at the true type pro￿le ￿ = (1;0;0) we can of-
fer a successful reward when constrained to the reward sets Yi
￿
￿0￿
. But at true pro￿le ￿ = (1;0;0);
agent 1 is even more keen on winning, and agents 2 and 3 are even less keen on winning, so that
there is no allocation in the reward set which could be used as a successful reward. Pictorially, the
indi⁄erence curve through the allocation f
￿
￿0￿
for the type pro￿le ￿ is strictly below the indi⁄er-
ence curve for the type pro￿le ￿0 for all three agents. In consequence Maskin monotonicity fails for
the generalized VCG mechanism.
Insert Figure 5: Maskin Monotonicity In Single Unit AuctionEx Post Implementation March 25, 2005 36
We contrast this negative result for Maskin monotonicity with a positive result for ex post






ex post monotonicity than with Maskin monotonicity, we do not seem to be on a promising track.













identi￿ed below as the sets which are delineated by the 45￿ line and thus strictly smaller than
before.
Insert Figure 6: Ex Post Monotonicity In Single Unit Auction (I)
The di⁄erence between Maskin and ex post monotonicity emerges as we observe that the de-
ceptive strategy ￿i : ￿i ! ￿i is determined by agent i independently of the other agents. In
particular, his deception ￿i (1) = 1
2 is constant with respect to the type pro￿le and the reports of
the other agents. It is this independence which we can then exploit. For example, we may consider
the true type pro￿le b ￿ = (1;1;1). At this pro￿le agent 1 still reports ￿i (1) = 1
2. We have not yet
said what the deception of agents 2 and 3 at this pro￿le might be. But for any report of agents 2
and 3, the monetary transfer of the winning agent will be strictly less than his value for the object.
Conversely, all loosing agents, would be willing to pay strictly more than the winning transfer
conditional on the reported types. But this means that we can assign a currently loosing agent the
object at a transfer which is higher than the reported but lower than his valuation of the object.
For simplicity, we depict below the case when agents 2 and 3 report their true value. In this case,
all three agents can be considered losers as neither of them is receiving the object with probability
one. It follows that we could o⁄er every single one of the three agents a successful reward.
Insert Figure 7: Ex Post Monotonicity In Single Unit Auction (II)
7.3 Private versus Interdependent Values
We are now in the position to make an interesting observation regarding the implementation of
the single unit auction. Suppose we consider the Vickrey auction (for the private value model)
and the generalized Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism (for the interdependent value model). With
private values, we have a failure of Maskin and ex post monotonicity. However with interdependent
values, this coincidence ceases to exist and while Maskin monotonicity continues to fail, ex post
monotonicity can be reestablished. While it is well-known that the second price auction cannot
be Nash implemented (see Saijo, Sjostrom & Yamato (2004)), the positive results here regarding
interdependent valuations are new in the literature.Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 37
The intuition for the divergence between private and interdependent values goes as follows. In
a private value model, if one agent submits the highest possible report and all other agents submit
the lowest possible report, then the former receives the object at the lowest possible price. Any
attempt to reward a whistle-blower will then inevitably violate the ex post incentive compatibility
constraint. In contrast, consider the exact same reporting strategy with interdependent valuations.
Now we can reward a loosing agent in all those instances where the loosing agents all report the
lowest value but in fact all have a higher valuation. We can reward every loosing agent by giving
him the object and asking him to pay only as much as the reported value would suggest. This
satis￿es ex post incentive compatibility, but at the same time provides the reward to break the
undesired equilibrium. Yet, it is clear that the argument relies essentially on interdependent rather
than private values. The distinction in the ex post implementation result between private and
interdependent values continues to exist for any arbitrary small amount of interdependence.
The distinction between private and interdependent values also becomes apparent in the role
of the three or more agent condition in Proposition 4. In a recent paper, Birulin (2003) shows that
with two agents there is a continuum of ine¢ cient undominated ex post equilibria in the single
unit auction model with the generalized VCG mechanism. The basic insight in Birulin (2003) is
easiest explained within the earlier linear set-up (see (23)). In this environment, the truthtelling
strategy certainly forms an e¢ cient ex post equilibrium. But Birulin (2003) shows there are other
equilibria which involve monotone, but discontinuous, reporting strategies, which lead to ine¢ cient
equilibria. The idea behind the construction is that over an arbitrary interval of pro￿les, agent
i overstates and agent j understates his type. The following pair of deceptions illustrate how an


















￿i, if ￿i 2 [0;￿i]
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1+￿ ; if ￿i 2 (￿i;￿i)




























The reporting strategy of each agent is monotone, but discontinuous at ￿i and ￿j, respectively. With
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, the equilibrium with the deception strategies (￿i;￿j) will lead to the e¢ cient
assignment of the object. The reporting strategies inside the open interval are chosen such that
they do not prevent truthtelling outside of the interval. In fact, the reporting strategies in (24) and
(25) are constructed precisely on the basis of the indi⁄erence conditions of i and j at the critical
pro￿les, ￿i = ￿i and ￿j = ￿j. The misreport of agent j is chosen such that the resulting transfer
payment of the generalized VCG mechanism makes agent i at ￿i = ￿i just indi⁄erent between
receiving the object and not receiving it:
￿i + ￿￿j = sj (￿j) + ￿sj (￿j). (26)
The rhs of the equality is the true value of the object to i and the lhs is the transfer agent i
would have to pay if, at the reported type sj (￿j), agent i were to receive the object. The above
equality determines the deception strategy of agent j which makes truthtelling for agent i ex post
incentive compatible even under the misreport of agent j and leads precisely to the deception
strategy displayed in (25). The related indi⁄erence condition for agent j is given by
￿j + ￿￿i = si (￿i) + ￿si (￿i);
and its solution leads again to the deception strategy displayed in (24).
We notice that the deception strategy of agent i is basically determined by agent j￿ s true
valuation and vice versa. This indicates that the same construction is not feasible anymore when
there are more than two agents. With more than two agents, the valuation of agent j will depend
on the type of agent i;j and k. In consequence the derivation of the deception strategy of agent i
will not only depend on agent j0s critical type, but the exact type of agent k. But of course the
strategy of agent i cannot depend simultaneously on the type of agent j and k. In fact, Proposition
4 showed that there will be no construction of a deception strategy which will lead to an equilibrium
di⁄erent from the truthtelling equilibrium.
8 Social Choice Sets
In the initial discussion of ex post and Maskin monotonicity we argued that the notions diverge in
two aspects: (i) the set of pro￿les at which rewards could be o⁄ered and (ii) the size of the reward
set. The single unit auction demonstrated the relevance of the ￿rst aspect. The set of pro￿les at
which the designer could o⁄er a reward to the whistle-blower was larger with ex post monotonicity.
In consequence, we could satisfy ex post monotonicity yet fail Maskin monotonicity. This section
considers the reverse case, in which Maskin monotonicity is satis￿ed but ex post monotonicity fails.Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 39
At the end of this section, we shall also discuss the relationship between functions, correspondences
and sets in the context of ex post implementation.
8.1 Pareto Correspondence
Maskin (1999) observes that many prominent social choice correspondences, among them the
Pareto, the Condorcet and the Walrasian correspondences, satisfy the complete information monotonic-
ity notion. We now show with a speci￿c Pareto correspondence that ex post monotonicity fails to
share this property. Similar examples can be constructed for the Condorcet and the Walrasian cor-
respondence. As we would expect, the divergence between the two notions arises from the di⁄erence
in the respective reward sets.
The Pareto correspondence is generally de￿ned by:
PO(￿) = fy 2 Y j8z 2 Y;9i s.t. ui (y;￿) ￿ ui (z;￿)g.
We consider an example with three agents, i = 1;2;3 and each agent has two possible types:
￿i 2 ￿i = f0;1g. A type pro￿le is then given by ￿ = (￿1;￿2;￿3) 2 ￿ = ￿3
i=1￿i. The set of
allocations, Y , has the same cardinality as the type space, ￿. For simplicity, allocations and type
pro￿les carry the same labels, but allocations are described as strings rather than vectors:
Y = f000;001;010;011;100;101;110;111g:
The payo⁄s of the agents are described for every true type pro￿le ￿ = (￿1;￿2;￿3) below. In each
matrix, each cell identi￿es the utility from a speci￿c allocation. As the type set coincides with the
allocation set, the described utilities also represent the payo⁄s arising in the direct mechanism for
any reported type pro￿le by the agents:
￿ = (0;0;0) :
￿3 = 0 ￿2 = 0 ￿2 = 1
￿1 = 0 3;0;0 0;0;0
￿1 = 1 1;1;1 0;0;0
￿3 = 1 ￿2 = 0 ￿2 = 1
￿1 = 0 0;0;0 0;";0
￿1 = 1 0;0;0 ";";"
￿ = (0;0;1) :
￿3 = 0 ￿2 = 0 ￿2 = 1
￿1 = 0 0;0;0 0;0;0
￿1 = 1 0;0;0 ";";"
￿3 = 1 ￿2 = 0 ￿2 = 1
￿1 = 0 0;3;0 1;1;1
￿1 = 1 0;0;0 ";0;0
￿ = (0;1;0) :
￿3 = 0 ￿2 = 0 ￿2 = 1
￿1 = 0 1;1;1 0;3;0
￿1 = 1 0;0;" 0;0;"
￿3 = 1 ￿2 = 0 ￿2 = 1
￿1 = 0 0;0;0 0;0;0
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￿ = (0;1;1) :
￿3 = 0 ￿2 = 0 ￿2 = 1
￿1 = 0 ";0;0 1;1;1
￿1 = 1 ";";" ";";0
￿3 = 1 ￿2 = 0 ￿2 = 1
￿1 = 0 0;0;0 0;0;3
￿1 = 1 0;0;0 0;";0
￿ = (1;0;0) :
￿3 = 0 ￿2 = 0 ￿2 = 1
￿1 = 0 0;0;" ";0;"
￿1 = 1 0;3;0 1;1;1
￿3 = 1 ￿2 = 0 ￿2 = 1
￿1 = 0 0;0;0 ";";"
￿1 = 1 0;0;0 ";0;0
￿ = (1;0;1) :
￿3 = 0 ￿2 = 0 ￿2 = 1
￿1 = 0 ";0;0 ";";"
￿1 = 1 1;1;1 0;0;0
￿3 = 1 ￿2 = 0 ￿2 = 1
￿1 = 0 0;0;0 0;0;0
￿1 = 1 0;0;3 0;0;0
￿ = (1;1;0) :
￿3 = 0 ￿2 = 0 ￿2 = 1
￿1 = 0 0;0;0 0;";0
￿1 = 1 ";0;0 0;0;1
￿3 = 1 ￿2 = 0 ￿2 = 1
￿1 = 0 ";";" ";";0
￿1 = 1 0;0;0 1;1;1
￿ = (1;1;1) :
￿3 = 0 ￿2 = 0 ￿2 = 1
￿1 = 0 ";";" 0;";0
￿1 = 1 0;0;" 0;0;0
￿3 = 1 ￿2 = 0 ￿2 = 1
￿1 = 0 0;0;0 1;1;1
￿1 = 1 0;0;0 3;0;0
The above example has the property that in every state ￿, there exist exactly two Pareto e¢ cient
allocations. The ￿rst Pareto allocation corresponds to the true state: y = ￿ and it favors one agent
with payo⁄ 3 and leaves the remaining two agents with payo⁄ 0. The identity of the favored agent
is determined by 1 +
P
i ￿i (mod3). The second Pareto allocation generates a uniform payo⁄ of
1 across agents. The remaining allocations are all Pareto inferior. Besides the Pareto allocations,
there is one more important allocation in this example, given by y = ￿0 with ￿i 6= ￿0
i for all i.
It generates a payo⁄ of " for all agents in all states and is obviously Pareto dominated. Yet, we
will show that it can be obtained as an ex post equilibrium under the deception ￿(￿) = ￿0. The
remaining payo⁄vectors are combination of 0 and " entries. In each one of the vectors, the 0 entries
serve to support (always) truthtelling and (always) misreporting as ex post equilibria in the direct
mechanism, whereas the " entries serve to shrink the ex post reward set.
In this example, the Pareto correspondence is described by PO : ￿ ! Y :
￿3 = 0 ￿2 = 0 ￿2 = 1
￿1 = 0 f000;100g f010;000g
￿1 = 1 f100;110g f110;111g
￿3 = 1 ￿2 = 0 ￿2 = 1
￿1 = 0 f001;011g f011;010g
￿1 = 1 f101;010g f111;011g
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The matrices describe the set of Pareto e¢ cient allocations as a function of the true type pro￿les
of the agents. The corresponding social choice set F is the set of all functions which satisfy
f (￿) 2 PO(￿) for all ￿ 2 ￿.
Maskin Monotonicity Maskin (1999) showed that the Pareto correspondence satis￿es com-
plete information monotonicity. For a better grasp of the di⁄erence between Maskin and ex post
monotonicity, it may be instructive to see how these di⁄erences play out in this example. We
therefore verify ￿rst that the Pareto selection f (￿) = ￿ for all ￿ 2 ￿, which assigns asymmetric
utilities, is Maskin monotone. The only relevant deception is the complete deception with:
￿i (￿i) 6= ￿i, 8i;8￿i.
Without loss of generality we may consider ￿ = (0;0;0) and ￿(0;0;0) = (1;1;1). By setting y = 000
and i = 1, we clearly satisfy Maskin monotonicity as:
3 = u1 (y;(0;0;0)) > u1 (f (￿(0;0;0));(0;0;0)) = ";
and
3 = u1 (f (￿(0;0;0));￿(0;0;0)) ￿ u1 (y;￿(0;0;0)) = ":
Ex Post Monotonicity We continue with ex post monotonicity and again consider ￿ = (0;0;0)
and ￿(0;0;0) = (1;1;1). We ￿rst observe that the candidate allocation y = 000, which we used in
the complete information setting is not in the ex post reward set Y1 (￿￿1) anymore. More precisely,
if the true type of agent 1 is ￿1 = 0, then agent 1 has an incentive to claim the reward y = 000
given the true type pro￿le of the remaining two agents is ￿￿1 = (1;1), or:
0 = u1 (f (0;￿￿1 (0;0));(0;￿￿1 (0;0))) < u1 (000;(0;￿￿1 (0;0))) = ".
At the true pro￿le ￿ = (0;0;0) and deception ￿(0;0;0) = (1;1;1), the designer could alternatively
o⁄er the reward y = 100, which is the second Pareto allocation. For every agent i, this allocation
satis￿es the reward equality:
1 = ui (100;(0;0;0)) > ui (f (￿(0;0;0));(0;0;0)) = ":
It also satis￿es the ex post incentive compatibility at the true type pro￿le ￿(0;0;0) = (1;1;1) for
agent 1 and 2; but fails for agent 3, as:
0 = u3 (f (￿(0;0;0));￿(0;0;0)) < u3 (100;￿(0;0;0)) = ":Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 42
Moreover, for agent 1 and 2, it fails to be satis￿ed at ￿0
i 6= ￿i with:
0 = u1 (f (0;￿￿1 (0;0));(0;￿￿1 (0;0))) < u1 (100;(0;￿￿1 (0;0))) = ";
and
0 = u2 (f (0;￿￿2 (0;0));(0;￿￿2 (0;0))) < u2 (100;(0;￿￿2 (0;0))) = 1:
By construction, the same argument goes through at every type pro￿le and in consequence, ex post
monotonicity fails in this example. The failure of ex post monotonicity comes as the reward set
Yi (￿￿i) is strictly smaller than Yi (￿) and in particular, eliminates all rewards which could satisfy
the reward inequality.12
8.2 Functions, Sets and Correspondences
The Pareto set is an example of a social choice set rather than a social choice function. This
naturally leads us to inquire the relationship between functions and sets in the context of ex post
implementation. In particular, we can ask whether implementation of a social choice set F is
equivalent to the implementation of every social choice function f 2 F separately. The obvious
direction is that if every f 2 F can be (ex post) implemented, then the social choice set F can be
implemented. The more di¢ cult direction is easy to understand with the following example. Let
the social choice set F be the set of all ex post incentive compatible plans, i.e. mappings from
pro￿les to allocations. By construction, it follows that F is ex post monotone and can be ex post
implemented. But of course a single element f 2 F may not be ex post implementable by itself
as there might be multiple equilibria under the social choice function f which do not correspond
to f under some pro￿les. By the revelation principle, any such distinct equilibrium will also be
an equilibrium under the corresponding direct mechanism. Hence a deception ￿ which forms an
equilibrium in f is an element in F and by contrast would not harm the implementability of F. It
follows more generally that the implementation of a social choice set F does not imply that every
social choice function f 2 F can be implemented separately.
The Pareto set was de￿ned as a correspondence from the set of pro￿les to the set of allocations.
On the basis of the Pareto correspondence, we naturally de￿ned an associated social choice set.
12The example is complicated as the Pareto correspondence is a set rather than a point everywhere. Yet, to display
a di⁄erence between ex post and Maskin monotonicity, this appears to be necessary. First, observe, that if the payo⁄s
were symmetric, then (generically) a Pareto e¢ cient allocation would also constitute a strictly Pareto dominant
allocation. The strictly dominant allocation clearly constitutes an ex post equilibrium and every deception ￿ could
be fended o⁄ by simply reestablishing the social choice allocation. The same argument continues to go through
without symmetry if there is a unique Pareto allocation in every state. It follows that for a (generic) discrepancy
between ex post and Maskin monotonicity, we need multiple Pareto e¢ cient allocations, which (generically) have to
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More generally, given a social choice correspondence ￿ : ￿ ! Y , we can de￿ne an associated social
choice set F = ff jf : ￿ ! Y g by including all social choice functions f which select at all pro￿les
allocations in the image of the correspondence:
F = ff jf (￿) 2 ￿(￿); 8￿ 2 ￿g.
Similarly, we can start with a social choice set F and de￿ne an associated social choice correspon-
dence by including all allocations y at a pro￿le ￿ which can be obtained by some selection f at ￿
from the social choice set F :
￿(￿) = fy jy = f (￿); f 2 F g.
With the above associations, we can then relate ex post implementation of sets and correspondences.
For the purpose of this discussion, it might be useful to keep in mind the class of social choice
problems in which a designer faces agents with quasilinear utility and wishes to implement the
social e¢ cient allocation without any balanced budget considerations. The social choice set of
e¢ cient and ex post incentive compatible allocations is then very large as the transfers to the
agents are essentially only determined up to a constant. However if we consider the associated social
choice correspondence, then we will typically loose the ex post incentive compatibility as arbitrary
combinations of transfers across pro￿les will not satisfy ex post incentive compatibility. For this
reason, incomplete information implementation typically considers sets rather than correspondences
and even though we analyze ex post rather than Bayesian equilibrium, social choice correspondences
typically still lack ex post incentive compatibility.
9 Mixed Strategy Implementation
Finally we extend the ex post implementation results to cover pure as well as mixed strategy
equilibria. In the process we shall also propose signi￿cantly weaker su¢ cient conditions for ex post
implementation. The proof strategy follows the argument for complete information implementation
with mixed strategies presented in Maskin (1999) and re￿ned in Maskin & Sjostrom (2004). The
idea of their proof is to enlarge the strategy space of each agent by allowing him to make a contingent
rather than deterministic reward proposal. In addition, they allow the agent to quote integers in
the augmented mechanism to prevent the possibility of further equilibria arising in the augmented
mechanism. We shall use the same basic idea but in addition use the integers to create lotteries in
the augmented mechanism. The introduction of lotteries is natural in an environment which allows
for mixed strategies. We then show that the use of lotteries has the additional advantage that we
can dispense with the ex post monotonicity no veto hypothesis as a su¢ cient condition and replaceEx Post Implementation March 25, 2005 44
it by a much weaker condition, called value distinction.13
The idea of using lotteries to weaken the su¢ cient condition also appears in a recent contribution
by Benoit & Ok (2004). In the complete information environment, they show that by using simple
lotteries the no veto condition can be replaced by a much weaker top-coincidence notion. As they
focus on pure strategy implementation, their augmented mechanism makes use only of modulo
rather than integer games. In sum, the use of random mechanism allows us to extend the earlier
implementation result from pure to mixed strategy implementation and to substantially weaken
the su¢ ciency conditions.
A mixed strategy for agent i is ￿i : ￿i ! ￿(Mi) and we denote the probability that type
￿i sends message mi under strategy ￿i by ￿i (mi j￿i). The set of feasible allocations Y is now
understood to be the set of all lotteries over a set of ￿nite deterministic outcomes Y , or Y = ￿(Y ).
De￿nition 19 (Ex Post Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies)
A mixed strategy pro￿le ￿￿ = (￿￿
1;:::;￿￿
I) is an ex post equilibrium if
X
m2M














for all i, ￿ and m0
i 2 Mi.
The mixed strategy ex post equilibrium maintains all the features of the pure strategy ex post
equilibrium. In particular, we observe that the no regret property is maintained conditional on the
true type pro￿le (but not conditional on every possible realization of messages). The notions of ex
post monotonicity and ex post implementation remain unchanged with the understanding that the
allocation y is possibly a lottery.
The necessary conditions for ex post implementation clearly remain necessary with the extension
to mixed strategy equilibria and stochastic mechanisms. The focus of the remainder of this section
is therefore on the su¢ ciency conditions. The no veto condition on the social choice set is replaced
by a very weak condition on the preferences of the agents, referred to as value distinction.14
De￿nition 20 (Value Distinction)
The environment satis￿es value distinction if for all ￿ 2 ￿ and all y;y0 2 Y , there exists i such
that ui (y;￿) 6= ui (y0;￿).
13We would like to thank Andy Postlewaite and Phil Reny for comments during a Cowles Foundation Conference
on ￿Robust Mechanism Design" which prompted us to pursue this argument.
14The notion of value distinction is di⁄erent from value distinguished types as de￿ned by Palfrey & Srivastava
(1989b). Their notion requires that for every pair, ￿i and ￿
0
i, by agent i, there exists an allocation y which is valued
di⁄erently by the two types, ￿i and ￿
0
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The basic novelty is the introduction of a contingent reward in the augmented mechanism. Each
agent sends a message of the form mi = (￿i;fi;zi;yi), where ￿i 2 ￿i, fi : ￿ ! Y is the social choice
function suggested by i, zi 2 N = f1;2;::::g; and yi 2 Y. The set of feasible messages for agent i is
given by
Mi = (￿i ￿ F ￿ N ￿ Y). (28)
A strategy pro￿le in this game is a collection ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿I), with ￿i : ￿i ! ￿(Mi).




























The outcome function g : M ! Y is de￿ned by three rules:
Rule 1. If at m (and reported type pro￿le ￿), we have for all i, fi = f for some f 2 F, then
g (m) = f (￿). (30)
Rule 2. If at m (and reported type pro￿le ￿), there exists j 2 N such that fi (￿) =
fk (￿); 8i;k 6= j and fi (￿) 6= fj (￿), then





zj+1 if y = fj (￿);
1
zj+1 if y = fi (￿);
0 if otherwise.
(31)
Rule 3. In all other cases, the agent j with the highest integer zj is the winner (and, in the









zj+1 pick y 2 Y , or



















The randomization in Rule 3 is simply a uniform randomization over the set of deterministic
outcomes, and #Y is the cardinality of the set of deterministic outcomes.
We refer to the mechanism described by the message space M = ￿I
i=1Mi, described by (28),
and the outcome function g : M ! Y, described by (30)-(32), as the augmented mechanism. In
contrast to the augmented mechanism presented in Section 4, the integer game is now de￿ned on
the natural numbers rather than a ￿nite set of numbers.
Theorem 5 (Mixed Strategy Implementation)
For I ￿ 3, if the environment satis￿es value-distinction and F satis￿es (EPIC) and (EM), then
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Proof. We use the augmented mechanism described by (28)-(32).
Claim 1. Every f 2 F can be realized as an ex post equilibrium with ￿i (mij￿i) > 0 )
mi = (￿i;f;￿;￿) for all ￿i 2 ￿i and all i. Thus suppose that all agents but j pursue the above
￿truthtelling￿strategy: ￿i (mij￿i) > 0 ) mi = (￿i;f;￿;￿), for all i 6= j. By (EPIC), it follows that
given fj = f, truthtelling for agent j, is a best response. It remains to argue that it remains a best
response if the restriction of fj = f is removed. But by de￿nition of fj (￿) and Rule 2, a deviation
to fj (￿) 6= f (￿) does not increase the utility of agent j, and may even decrease the utility of agent
j, and hence it follows that every f 2 F can be realized as an ex post equilibrium.
Claim 2. In any ex post equilibrium with fi = f;8i;8￿; g (m) = f (￿) for some f 2 F. Suppose
not, then by ex post monotonicity, there exists an agent i, a type pro￿le ￿, and an allocation y
which strictly improves the utility of agent i, and under Rule 2, he can obtain this improvement
with arbitrarily large probability.
Claim 3. In any ex post equilibrium, ￿i (mij￿i) > 0 ) mi = (￿;f;￿;￿). Suppose not and
hence there exists an ex post equilibrium with ￿j (￿;f;￿;￿j￿) < 1 for some j at some ￿ 2 ￿ and
￿i (￿;f;￿;￿j￿) = 1 for all other i. Then with positive probability the allocation will be either fi (￿)
or fj (￿). By value distinction, there exists an agent k who assigns di⁄erent utilities to these two
di⁄erent allocations. If k happens to be j, then by proposing a su¢ ciently large integer zj, he
guarantees himself a higher payo⁄. If k 6= j, then k can make a proposal fk (￿) 6= f (￿) such that
Rule 3 will be applied in which k can guarantee himself to be the winner with arbitrarily high
probability, and thus lower the probability of receiving the low utility arbitrarily close to zero.
Consider ￿nally an ex post equilibrium with i;j such that for fi;fj 6= f:
￿i (￿;fi;￿;￿j￿)￿j (￿;fj;￿;￿j￿) > 0:
Now the above argument applies again and it follows that there cannot exist an ex post equilibrium
where Rule 3 is applied with positive probability.
Benoit & Ok (2004) show that by using ￿simple￿stochastic mechanisms, the su¢ cient conditions
for Nash implementation in pure strategies can be substantially weakened. In particular, the no veto
condition of the social choice set can be replaced by much weaker conditions on (i) the social choice
function, namely weak unanimity and (ii) the preferences, namely a top coincidence condition. Our
Theorem 5 does not require weak unanimity and the value distinction condition is strictly weaker
than their top coincidence condition. Their top coincidence condition says that if for every pro￿le
￿ and every i there exists at most a single allocation z such that:
uj (z;￿) ￿ uj (y;￿); 8j 6= i; 8y 2 Y . (33)Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 47
To see why value distinction is (strictly) weaker, ￿x any arbitrary ￿ and i, and suppose that there
does not exist an allocation z which is the preferred allocation for all agents j 6= i. Then there
exist at least two agents, j and k, which di⁄er in their most preferred allocation, call them yj;yk,
respectively. In consequence, for at least one of the agents, say j, we have uj (yj;￿) 6= uj (yk;￿). The
same argument goes through if there does exist a single allocation z satisfying (33). By implication,
there must exist another allocation y which is not the most preferred allocation for all j 6= i. For the
allocation y and a particular agent j, we then have value distinction again: uj (z;￿) 6= uj (y;￿). It is
further immediate that the two conditions, top coincidence and value distinction, do not coincide,
which establishes the strict implication.
We can replace top coincidence by the weaker value distinction condition because we allow
for more than ￿simple￿ stochastic allocations. In the augmented mechanism of Benoit & Ok
(2004), the whistle-blower i claims the reward by choosing a lottery which selects the reward y
and the social choice f (￿) with equal probability, the ￿simple￿stochastic allocation. As y 6= f (￿);
the top coincidence condition then implies that there will be another agent j who has a strict
preference between y and f (￿), and can impose his choice by appealing to Rule 3. In our augmented
mechanism, the whistle-blower i can always increase the probability of receiving the reward by
increasing the integer zi, and hence it su¢ ces that for the pair of allocations, y and f (￿); there
exists an agent who values the two allocations di⁄erently. The second condition in Benoit & Ok
(2004), weak unanimity, is not necessary in our augmented mechanism either. The use of random
allocations in Rule 3 excludes the possibility of equilibria with a strategy pro￿le in which Rule 3
applies. Consequently, we can use the condition of value distinction as in Theorem 5 to obtain
an even more permissive result for Nash implementation with mixed strategies, which we simply
report here.
Corollary 2 (Nash Implementation with Mixed Strategies)
For I ￿ 3, if the environment satis￿es value distinction and if F satis￿es Maskin monotonicity,
then F is Nash implementable in mixed strategies.
10 Conclusion
In this paper we reported a comprehensive set of results on the possibility of ex post implemen-
tation. The general necessary and su¢ cient conditions for ex post implementation have a similar
structure as the well-known conditions for Nash and Bayesian Nash implementation. Ex post equi-
librium requires that every strategy pro￿le remains an equilibrium choice even if a given agent
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derlying the notion of an ex post equilibrium are hence closer to complete information, i.e. Nash
implementation. In consequence, we pursued a close comparison of the conditions for Nash and ex
post implementation. We showed that the respective necessary and su¢ cient conditions are not
nested, and that neither Nash nor ex post notions imply the other.
However, in the important class of single crossing environments, we showed that ex post
monotonicity is given virtually for free as it is known to be true for Maskin monotonicity. Yet
in the single crossing environment, for Maskin monotonicity to hold , the social choice function
must be everywhere in the interior of the set of feasible alternatives. Ex post monotonicity however
can already be guaranteed even if the social choice function is rarely in the interior of the feasible
set. As an important example we showed that the single unit auction with interdependent values
can be ex post, but not Nash implemented. Interestingly, the positive implementation results relied
on interdependent values and do not hold for private values. Additionally, we showed that in the
single crossing environment ex post implementation is possible in the direct mechanism and does
not have to rely on the augmented mechanisms which have been frequently criticized for various
unrealistic features, such as modulo or integer games.
In earlier work, Bergemann & Morris (2004), we investigated the role of ex post equilibrium for
robust incentive compatibility. In particular, we showed that the notion of ex post equilibrium can
be justi￿ed as a robust equilibrium concept in the sense that the social objective can be obtained
as a Bayesian equilibrium for every possible type space if and only if it can be obtained as an ex
post equilibrium. In a companion paper, Bergemann & Morris (2005), we separately investigate
the role of the ex post equilibrium as a robust implementation notion.Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 49
11 Appendix
11.1 Private Values
The analysis of this paper applies to interdependent value environments. In the special case of
private values, ex post incentive compatibility implies dominant strategy incentive compatibility,
under which dominant strategy implementation (and thus ex post implementation) is trivially
possible in the direct mechanism. In this section, we very brie￿ y state without proof the simple
connections between the properties described in this section in the special case of private values.
De￿nition 21 (Private Values)
There are private values if







for all i, y, ￿i, ￿￿i and ￿0
￿i.
De￿nition 22 (Dominant Strategies Incentive Compatibility)
Social choice set F is dominant strategies incentive compatible if for every f 2 F :








for all i, ￿, ￿0.
Lemma 2 Under private values, F is ex post incentive compatible if and only if F is dominant
strategies incentive compatible.
De￿nition 23 (Strict Dominant Strategies Incentive Compatibility)
Social choice set F is strictly dominant strategies incentive compatible if for every f 2 F :








for all i, ￿ and ￿0 with ￿0
i 6= ￿i.
Lemma 3 Under private values, F is strictly ex post incentive compatible if and only if F is strictly
dominant strategies incentive compatible.
Lemma 4 Under private values, if F satis￿es strict dominant strategies incentive compatibility,
then F satis￿es ex post monotonicity.Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 50
11.2 Ex Post Monotonicity No Veto for Sets
We now state the ex post monotonicity no veto condition (EMNV ) for the case of a social choice
set rather than social choice function. Given a social choice set F and a deception ￿, we de￿ne for
each f 2 F and i a set ￿
f
i ￿ ￿i and let ￿f = ￿I
i=1￿
f
i ￿ ￿. The set ￿f represents the set of pro￿les
at which the agents all agree to implement the selection f 2 F. The no veto power condition is






De￿nition 24 (Ex Post Monotonicity No Veto (For Sets))
F satis￿es ex post monotonicity no veto if for any deception ￿ and any product set ￿ ￿ ￿ the
following holds. If the environment is non-economic at each ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿, then
1. there exists ^ f 2 F which satis￿es no veto power on ￿ ￿ ￿ and
2. if f (￿(￿)) 6= ^ f (￿) for some f and some ￿ 2 ￿f then there exists i, ￿ 2 ￿f and y such that























The proof of Theorem 3 now goes through simply by extending the argument from the a single
set ￿f to the union of sets
[
f2F
￿f. We simply record it is a Corollary.
Corollary 3 (Su¢ ciency for Social Choice Sets)
For I ￿ 3, if the social choice set F satis￿es (EPIC) and (EMNV ), then F is ex post imple-
mentable.Ex Post Implementation March 25, 2005 51
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Figure 1: Reward Sets
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Figure 2: Successful Reward Sets
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Figure 4: Failure of Strict Ex Post Incentive Compatibility
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